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This policy brief reviews evidence and draws lessons 
regarding the role of microfinance for income and 
consumption smoothing by the poor, and highlights 
potential areas for product innovation by the micro-
finance sector to address the demand for financial 





Poor, food-insecure households seek to avoid the risk 
of falling below a minimum level of consumption of food 
and other basic goods that would threaten their survival. 
In general, there are two types of risk coping, income 
smoothing and consumption smoothing. Households can 
smooth income by making conservative production or 
employment choices, diversifying economic activities, or 
taking steps to protect themselves from adverse income 
shocks before they occur. Households can smooth 
consumption by borrowing and saving and by employing 
formal and informal insurance arrangements. These 
actions help insulate consumption from income 
variability. 
 In short, improved access to financial services can have 
two principal effects on households. First, it can raise the 
expected value of income and therefore of consumption 
and future investment and asset accumulation. This is the 
traditional and often sole argument for provision of 
services by MFIs. Second, it can decrease the downward 
risk of too low an income to satisfy basic consumption 
needs. Poorer households, for which this consideration is 
especially important, tend to value financial services that 
address the risk-coping motive relatively more, while 
wealthier households tend to place higher value on finan-
cial services that generate income and aid the accumu-




 A number of studies reviewed in a synthesis paper by 
IFPRI (see references) show that lack of access to 
financial services for income and consumption smoothing 
can have serious implications on livelihood. For example, 
the nutritional status of children in poorer households in 
Bangladesh severely suffers in the aftermath of disastrous 
floods as a result of insufficient informal coping mecha-
nisms and access of credit. Similarly, a study in Peru 
found that during adverse times, credit-constrained 
parents tend to withdraw children from school and put 
them into income-earning jobs. In India, child labor plays 
a significant role in the self-insurance strategy of poor 
rural households. 
 Most formal credit and savings services are not useful 
for consumption smoothing because they may be ap-
proved only after considerable waiting time, carry high 
transaction costs, or specifically given for production 
purposes. In the same vein, many commonly found sav-
ings products are of little use to those who wish to save 
because of precautionary motives, e.g., some savings de-
posits may only be withdrawn after a waiting period or, as 
is common in the majority of credit-focused microfinance 
schemes, a fixed percentage may be held to secure a loan. 
IFPRI’s studies point out that much of the savings 
behavior of the poor is motivated by the wish to hold 
precautionary savings so as to retain capacity for future 
consumption smoothing. It is important to recognize that 
such savings can be held in four different forms. First, 
households may hold buffer stocks in the form of assets 
that can be liquidated in the event of transitory income 
shocks. Livestock, food, and money under the pillow are 
common forms of precautionary savings in developing 
countries. These informal savings are subject to a number 
of risks, such as inflation, animal disease, and theft. 
Second, households may choose not to fully utilize 
available credit limits but preserve the option to borrow 
for “worse” times. Third, precautionary savings can be 
held in the form of human capital, for example, by having 
more children to meet unexpected future shortages in 
family labor due to health risks, or by having better-
educated children. Finally, investing in personal 
relationships and membership can generate precautionary 
savings in the form of social capital, for example, in 
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social and other institutions at the community level. It is 
not unreasonable to expect that social capital, like any 
other form of capital, can be used more intensively in 
future periods when transitory income shocks occur. The 
culture of reciprocal gift giving is deeply embedded in 
many societies. Having more social capital can increase 





It is important to distinguish between idiosyncratic and 
covariant risks, that is, risks that affect only some indi-
viduals or larger groups of people in the same locality, re-
spectively. Covariant risks include, for example, drought 
and flood, whereas individual risks are disability to work 
or old age. Since most MFIs in developing countries at 
present are too small in terms of number of clientele and 
geographical coverage, their ability to effectively cover 
covariant risks is very limited. However, as MFIs grow 
over time and reach operational scales like those achieved 
by Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), BRAC, or the Grameen 
Bank, there is also considerable potential to sustainably 
address covariant risks. For example, the Grameen Bank 
and BRI have rescheduled loans to clients in areas of 
natural disasters. BRI can do this without assistance from 
the state because of its high profits and its business 
conviction that the loss of a good borrower is also a loss 
to BRI. The Grameen Bank has also rescheduled loans for 
clients affected by flood. The Grameen Bank requires 
members to deposit small amounts of savings into a so-
called emergency fund. The pooling of such funds over 
larger areas can, in principal, address covariant risks. 
A few innovative MFIs have developed financial 
products that address idiosyncratic risks. While MFIs 
should not be overburdened by being asked to provide 
health insurance services, MFIs can provide precau-
tionary savings services and consumption credit that can 
indirectly address health risks. For example, village banks 
that follow the FINCA model or the model developed by 
the French NGO Centre International de Développement 
et de Recherche (CIDR) raise funds for internal consump-
tion loans for their members. Other examples of MFIs 
that explicitly provide consumption credit, include Caja 
Social in Mexico and BRAC in Bangladesh. SEWA in 
India, which targets microloans to very poor women, 
allows borrowers to stop loan repayment during preg-
nancy. Health risks can also be addressed by the provision 
of precautionary savings services. This type of service is 
useful for many types of risks, provided that the maturity 
of the deposit, its interest rate, and its transaction costs for 
deposits and withdrawals on short notice are adjusted 
accordingly. For health risks that occur relatively fre-
quently and demand immediate response, the cost and 
time for withdrawal must be minimal. A current account 
at a village bank or a nearby bank branch offers such 
features as does a term deposit that can be withdrawn at 
short notice with a penalty. Examples of banks that 
successfully offer savings services to a diverse clientele, 
including the poor, are BancoSol in Bolivia and BRI in 
Indonesia. 
A number of MFIs offer life insurance to cover risks of 
death or lack of care during old age. Most often, however, 
the contract only covers the borrower’s outstanding debt 
in case of death. This is the case, for example, for BRI or 
ASA in Bangladesh. BRAC, on the other hand, offers a 
life insurance contract that pays a predetermined sum in 
case of the member’s death. 
Because of sociocultural constraints, women often 
cannot get a loan unless they are married and their 
husband is a cosigner. MFIs ought to refuse to practice 
such discrimination. By providing women with individual 
credit lines and savings accounts, their household 
bargaining power may increase. Moreover, individual 
accounts for women will enable them to have a much 




Access to microfinance has the potential not only to 
assist the poor to earn income from microenterprise, but 
also to smooth income and consumption. The first 
potential effect is what primarily motivates the 
microfinance movement today. Yet, the second-effect 
increases in relative importance as the poverty level of 
MFI-clients increases. MFIs, especially if they seek to 
benefit the poor, should concentrate more effort on credit, 
savings, and insurance services that can mitigate risks. 
The largest potential for microfinance is seen for 
addressing idiosyncratic risks, such as those related to 
health, disability, old age, and divorce. When MFIs grow 
in scale and increase their outreach to both poor and 
nonpoor groups, they also increase their potential to help 
their clients’ address covariant risks. 
A number of innovative MFIs offer financial products 
that respond to these risks. These include flexible saving 
services that permit prompt withdrawals, consumption 
credit, and even explicit health and life insurance. 
The poorer the target group of an MFI, the more 
important is that MFI’s experiment with new products for 
income and consumption smoothing. Through pro-poor 
product innovation, the MFIs’ costs of targeting the poor 
may decrease. However, when MFIs choose to broaden 
their offering of financial services, they must be aware of 
the greater portfolio and liquidity risks that such a 
strategy entails. Prudence would suggest that MFIs first 
target areas with low covariant risks, and gradually 
expand client outreach to higher risk areas. Higher 
liquidity reserves and larger equity capital appear also to 
be appropriate responses to covariant risks. Client-funded 
emergency funds that are pooled over large areas have the 
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